The weak jobs recovery: whatever happened to "the great American jobs machine"? by Richard B. Freeman & William M. Rodgers, III
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 3
The Weak Jobs Recovery: 
Whatever Happened to 
“the Great American 
Jobs Machine”?
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
uring the 1990s, the U.S. labor market drew plaudits
 around the world for the large number of jobs it created. 
The rate of unemployment fell to levels below those of most 
other advanced economies and the percentage of the 
population in employment rose to its highest level in history, as 
even the less-skilled and former “welfare mothers” found jobs. 
At the same time, productivity grew smartly, real wages rose 
after decades of stagnation or decline, the seemingly inexorable 
rise of inequality ended, and poverty fell. Europe marveled at 
“the great American jobs machine” and sought solutions to its 
problems by looking at U.S. policies and practices.
What a difference a few years make.
More than three years have passed since the Business Cycle 
Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) declared that the U.S. economy had begun 
its recovery. Yet compared with the past five recoveries, 
3.1 million fewer people are working today than at the outset of 
the recovery.1Although by historical standards, the percentage 
of the employed population is high, it remains 2 percentage 
points lower than it did in spring 2000—the boom’s peak. The 
weak jobs recovery since 2001 has created greater economic 
problems for Americans than Europe’s sluggish job 
performance in the 1990s created for Europeans. The United 
States has only a limited safety net for workers. Those who lose 
their jobs risk losing health care or seeing their family drop 
from the middle class into poverty.
This paper examines the operation of the U.S. labor market 
in the 2001 recovery. Because the United States is in the middle 
of the recovery, ours is a real-time analysis; thus, some 
conclusions could change if the recovery stalls or employment 
grows suddenly. For instance, since August 2003, nonfarm 
payroll employment increased by 2.5 million, for a monthly 
average of 146,000, while the household survey showed a 
comparable increase of 2.6 million.2 However, seventeen 
months of job growth that barely kept pace with civilian 
population growth does not gainsay the surprising U.S. 
inability to generate jobs for so long in this recovery. It would 
take employment growth of some 300,00 per month over the 
next year and a half to bring the employment-population rate 
to the 64.4 level it held during 2000.
2. The Challenge of the Jobless 
Recovery 
“How come we see recovery every place but in the labor 
market?” (adapted from Robert Solow).
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Chart 1
Cumulative Employment Growth during
the Seven Most Recent Recoveries
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
nonfarm payroll establishment data (<http://www.bls.gov>). 
Note: Each series is benchmarked to the start of its recovery as
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business
Cycle Dating Committee.
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Our first and most important finding is that the current 
recovery has been the worst in recent U.S. economic history in 
terms of job creation. Employment growth has been much 
slower than it has been in all post–World War II recoveries—
including the 1990s recovery, when employment also took an 
extraordinarily long time to rebound (Chart 1).3 Typically, 
employment growth lags business cycle recoveries by three to 
four months. In the 1990s recovery, the lag was a little more 
than two years. In the current recovery, the lag is three to four 
years and, at the time of our writing, the labor market has not 
yet clearly recovered.
During the 2004 presidential campaign, it was natural that 
the Democrats stressed the lack of job growth while the 
incumbent Republicans downplayed the issue, directing 
attention at the relatively moderate rate of unemployment. 
However, as stated by Kevin Hassett, Director of Economic 
Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research: “It’s not a partisan issue, it is a fact. The labor 
market is worse than in the typical recovery.”4 The poor 
recovery in the labor market goes beyond sluggish job growth. 
While the rate of unemployment has been moderate, the 
duration of joblessness has been high three years into the 
recovery, and an exceptional proportion of persons not 
participating in the labor market want to work (Schreft, Singh, 
and Hodgson 2004). In addition, as these authors emphasize, a 
large share of jobs created in the recovery were temporary. 
Almost 30 percent of new jobs created from November 2001 to 
December 2004 were in the temporary-help services sector. 
During the 1990s recovery, only 10 percent of new jobs were in 
temporary-help services.5
Our second finding is that the slow growth of employment 
is not due to the strikingly weak job performance of a particular 
sector, such as the dot-com sector in the aftermath of its boom-
bust cycle. To be sure, there was an asset-price-bubble 
component to the 1990s boom that can help explain job 
problems in some of the “new economy” sectors.6 However, we 
find that employment at the end of 2004 was markedly below 
employment at the start of the recovery in many private sector 
industries, not simply in those affected by the dot-com boom. 
In December 2004, employment was 9 percent lower in durable 
manufacturing and 9 percent lower in nondurable 
manufacturing than it was when the recovery began (Chart 2). 
Employment showed no growth in the retail, wholesale, and 
transportation sectors. It grew modestly in education and 
health services, government, financial activities, and some 
other services. However, employment fell in many other service 
sectors, including the broad “information” industries (such as 
telecoms, newspapers, movies, and cable TV)—a major part of 
the new economy that is supposed to be producing good jobs 
to replace declining employment in traditional manufacturing.
 Offering further evidence of the breadth of the weak labor 
market in the boom, our third finding is that employment 
growth was down among groups especially sensitive to business 
cycle swings, but unlikely to be affected by the dot-com bubble 
narrowly defined: African-Americans, new labor market 
entrants, out-of-school youth, and less-educated workers.7 
Historically, recessions take their toll first on these groups, but 
in recoveries they benefit from larger increases in employment 
than more advantaged groups. Table 1 shows that in the 2001 
recovery, African-Americans, out-of-school youth, and new 
labor market entrants had worse employment experiences 
relative to those of other workers than they did in the two 
previous recoveries, with the 2001 recovery showing greater 
employment declines.8 New entrants with no more than a 
high-school degree have borne the largest brunt of the weak 
recovery: the employment-population ratios of black and white 
men fell 5.1 and 3.0 percentage points, respectively, while the 
estimated drops for black and white women were 4.3 and 
2.3 percentage points, respectively.
Over the same period, the labor market for highly educated 
and skilled workers did not tighten, as it did in typical 
recoveries. Table 1 illustrates this pattern for new-entrant male 
and female black college graduates: although not measured 
with a high level of precision, their respective employment-
population ratios fell 1.5 and 2.0 percentage points. It is safe to 
conclude that their prospects have not improved during the 
recovery. At the same time, some white-collar workers who FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 5
normally have low unemployment even in recessions have had 
more trouble finding jobs than they did in virtually any other 
recovery. The rate of unemployment among electrical 
engineers, for example, has exceeded the national 
unemployment rate, while joblessness is also found among 
various workers in computer programming. Here, possibly, are 
the footprints of the dot-com experience, though it is more 
likely that the problems in these job markets will be more long 
term because of outsourcing of computer-related work to India 
and other developing countries.
Our fourth finding is that the jobless recovery has no 
particular geographic dimension. Analyzing employment 
growth by state, we find that compared with the current 
recovery, the typical state’s employment grew 2.6 to 4.8 percent 
faster in the 1990s recovery and 4.5 to 6.3 percent faster in the 
1980s recovery. Current employment growth is substantially 
weaker across the board, with two distinct patterns emerging 
(see appendix). Employment growth in states that have 
experienced any increase in jobs during the current recovery 
has been slower than it has been in past recoveries. Arizona and 
Florida exemplify this pattern: employment growth in these 
states was slightly more than 1 percent between 2001 and 2003. 
During comparable periods in earlier recoveries, growth was 
two to four times higher. Elsewhere, in contrast with the 1980s 
and 1990s recoveries, there has been a contraction in 
employment. Michigan and Ohio fit this pattern: during the 
current recovery, employment in these states fell 1 to 4 percent, 
compared with modest increases in earlier recoveries.
3. Wages, Inequality, and Poverty
In the 1980s recovery and in the early part of the 1990s 
recovery, slow productivity growth and loose labor markets led 
to slow growth of earnings relative to inflation. This trend 
ended after 1995, when productivity growth began to accelerate 
and labor markets tightened. For the first time in two or more 
decades, real wages rose even for those at the bottom of the 
earnings or skill distribution. In the 2001 recovery, 
productivity has performed well while wages have shown a 
disparate pattern of change. Table 2 shows that from 2001 to 
2004, men’s earnings stagnated while women’s earnings grew 
modestly. Looking across a variety of earnings series, we note 
that some series show modest gains while others do not, 
making it hard to pin down what has happened to wages and 
inequality in the weak jobs recovery. Published earnings data 
from the Current Population Survey suggest that the median 
weekly earnings of full-time employees barely kept pace with 
inflation in 2004 while the real earnings of the groups most 
vulnerable to a weak labor market fell in the recovery. The 
median earnings of all workers fell 0.5 percent while the real 
Percentage change
Chart 2
Employment Growth at Similar Points in Recovery
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, nonfarm payroll establishment data (<http://www.bls.gov>). 
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Table 1
Changes in Employment-Population Ratios for Vulnerable Groups, from End of Recession 




Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region Unadjusted
Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region
1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01
All
Black 0.039 -0.007 -0.034 0.028 -0.019 -0.013 0.035 0.008 -0.022 0.028 0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
White 0.017 -0.002 -0.017 0.009 -0.003 0.006 0.026 0.012 -0.005 0.022 0.010 0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Black-white 0.022 -0.006 -0.018 0.019 -0.016 -0.019 0.009 -0.004 -0.017 0.006 -0.009 -0.018
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Out-of-school youth
Black 0.066 -0.054 -0.039 0.050 -0.065 -0.020 0.023 0.001 -0.025 0.014 -0.003 0.008
(0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.021)
White 0.039 -0.014 -0.032 0.013 -0.022 -0.013 -0.008 -0.016 -0.021 -0.018 -0.023 0.017
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Black-white 0.027 -0.040 -0.007 0.037 -0.043 -0.007 0.031 0.017 -0.004 0.032 0.020 -0.009
(0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.022)
New entrants
Black 0.077 -0.002 -0.051 0.066 -0.017 -0.027 0.053 0.019 -0.043 0.040 0.007 -0.017
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
White 0.039 0.001 -0.030 0.035 -0.007 -0.004 0.042 0.009 -0.023 0.033 0.000 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016)
Black-white 0.038 -0.003 -0.021 0.032 -0.010 -0.023 0.011 0.010 -0.020 0.007 0.007 -0.024
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
New-entrant high-school 
  dropouts
Black 0.055 0.001 -0.055 0.058 0.003 -0.019 0.023 0.044 -0.033 0.014 0.035 0.006
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
White 0.027 -0.019 -0.054 0.030 -0.012 -0.013 0.026 0.002 -0.049 0.024 -0.005 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.032) (0.032)
Black-white 0.028 0.019 -0.001 0.029 0.015 -0.006 -0.003 0.042 0.017 -0.010 0.040 -0.007
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 7
Table 1 (Continued)
Changes in Employment-Population Ratios for Vulnerable Groups, from End of Recession 




Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region Unadjusted
Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region
1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01
New-entrant high-school 
  graduates
Black 0.058 -0.064 -0.039 0.055 -0.061 -0.004 0.055 -0.040 -0.018 0.051 -0.036 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014)
White 0.056 -0.006 -0.036 0.048 0.000 0.002 0.036 -0.021 -0.024 0.035 -0.019 0.013
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.029) (0.029)
Black-white 0.002 -0.059 -0.002 0.006 -0.061 -0.006 0.019 -0.019 0.006 0.016 -0.018 0.002
(0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
New-entrant college 
  graduates
Black 0.070 -0.027 -0.015 0.070 -0.037 0.003 0.042 0.026 -0.020 0.046 0.021 -0.002
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015)
White 0.006 0.003 -0.011 0.008 -0.007 0.005 0.035 0.015 0.000 0.036 0.011 0.018
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.036) (0.031) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022) (0.038) (0.032)
Black-white 0.064 -0.030 -0.003 0.063 -0.031 -0.002 0.006 0.011 -0.020 0.010 0.009 -0.019
(0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
Source: Authors’ calculations, from assorted years of Current Population Survey’s ORG files. 
Notes: “All” denotes individuals sixteen and over. “Out-of-school youth” denotes individuals with no more than a high-school degree, sixteen to twenty-four 
years of age, and not enrolled in school. The columns labeled “Unadjusted” are constructed from regressions that pool the years 1982, 1985, 1991, 1994, 2001, 
and 2004, where the variables are white dummy variable, year dummy variables, and the interactions between the white dummy variable and the year dummy 
variables. The columns labeled “Adjusted” are constructed from the same specification, but controls for years of school, potential experience, and census
division of residence are included.8T h e  W e a k  J o b s  R e c o v e r y
Table 2




Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region Unadjusted
Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region
1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01
All
Black -0.064 0.004 -0.010 -0.067 -0.025 -0.129 0.004 0.018 0.016 -0.016 -0.008 -0.135
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
White -0.028 -0.003 -0.009 -0.048 -0.036 -0.116 0.001 0.023 0.021 -0.019 0.005 -0.127
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Black-white -0.037 0.007 -0.001 -0.020 0.011 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.013 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Out-of-school youth
Black -0.084 -0.030 0.015 -0.104 -0.035 -0.082 -0.034 -0.038 -0.048 -0.068 -0.023 -0.191
(0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
White 0.000 -0.032 -0.015 -0.061 -0.031 -0.093 0.004 -0.029 -0.024 -0.048 -0.030 -0.139
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Black-white -0.084 0.002 0.030 -0.042 -0.004 0.011 -0.038 -0.009 -0.024 -0.020 0.007 -0.052
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
New entrants
Black -0.108 -0.022 0.002 -0.103 -0.026 -0.127 -0.040 -0.023 -0.037 -0.043 -0.012 -0.186
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
White -0.054 -0.022 -0.025 -0.066 -0.029 -0.128 -0.024 -0.008 -0.009 -0.040 -0.010 -0.152
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020)
Black-white -0.054 0.000 0.027 -0.037 0.003 0.001 -0.017 -0.015 -0.028 -0.004 -0.002 -0.034
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
New-entrant high-school 
  dropouts
Black -0.135 -0.070 0.005 -0.104 -0.037 -0.072 -0.096 -0.068 -0.022 -0.103 -0.050 -0.173
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.021)
White -0.070 -0.050 -0.015 -0.074 -0.026 -0.083 -0.052 -0.042 -0.043 -0.054 -0.021 -0.160
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.040) (0.041) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.046) (0.044)
Black-white -0.065 -0.019 0.021 -0.029 -0.011 0.011 -0.044 -0.026 0.020 -0.049 -0.029 -0.013
(0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 9
Table 2 (Continued)




Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region Unadjusted
Adjusted for Education, 
Potential Experience,
and Region
1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01 1985-82 1994-91 2004-01
New-entrant high-school 
  graduates
Black -0.114 -0.030 -0.002 -0.119 -0.023 -0.133 -0.063 -0.020 -0.044 -0.056 -0.013 -0.183
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014)
White -0.062 -0.037 -0.027 -0.078 -0.031 -0.119 -0.045 -0.021 -0.024 -0.053 -0.020 -0.149
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.019) (0.034) (0.034) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.032) (0.030)
Black-white -0.052 0.007 0.025 -0.041 0.009 -0.015 -0.018 0.001 -0.019 -0.003 0.007 -0.034
(0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
New-entrant college 
  graduates
Black -0.054 -0.048 -0.058 -0.051 -0.037 -0.151 0.128 -0.014 -0.074 0.107 0.023 -0.184
(0.071) (0.067) (0.059) (0.066) (0.056) (0.042) (0.056) (0.050) (0.044) (0.052) (0.043) (0.032)
White 0.019 0.021 -0.061 0.003 0.021 -0.168 0.028 0.001 -0.002 0.019 0.012 -0.117
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.068) (0.103) (0.089) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.052) (0.078) (0.067)
Black-white -0.073 -0.068 0.003 -0.054 -0.058 0.016 0.099 -0.015 -0.072 0.087 0.011 -0.067
(0.073) (0.070) (0.061) (0.068) (0.065) (0.057) (0.058) (0.052) (0.046) (0.054) (0.049) (0.043)
Source: Authors’ calculations, from assorted years of Current Population Survey’s ORG files. 
Notes: “All” denotes individuals sixteen and over. “Out-of-school youth” denotes individuals with no more than a high-school degree, sixteen to twenty-four 
years of age, and not enrolled in school. The columns labeled “Unadjusted” are constructed from regressions that pool the years 1982, 1985, 1991, 1994, 2001, 
and 2004, where the variables are white dummy variable, year dummy variables, and the interactions between the white dummy variable and the year 
dummy variables. The columns labeled “Adjusted” are constructed from the same specification, but controls for years of school, potential experience, and 
census division of residence are included.10 The Weak Jobs Recovery
earnings of high-school dropouts and graduates declined 
2.2 and 0.8 percent, respectively. Earnings of workers at the 
bottom of the distribution also dropped through 2004:3. 
Between 2003:3 and 2004:3, real earnings for the bottom 
10 percent of the wage distribution declined 1.7 percent.
Slow pay rises, however, are not the fundamental problem 
of the weak jobs recovery. The problem is sluggish employment 
growth. The combination of stagnant employment and 
sluggish real wage growth has meant that poverty rose through 
2003, albeit modestly. This pattern contrasts with the usual 
pattern of poverty falling as GDP grows. Moreover, several key 
labor market statistics correlated with poverty show no 
improvement at the time of our writing. The employment of 
Americans who are high-school dropouts or African-
Americans has not improved since the U.S. Census Bureau 
collected the poverty data. Specifically, from December 2003 to 
December 2004, the percentage of high-school dropouts and 
African-Americans in employment remained at 36 and 
56 percent, respectively.9 If the recovery does eventually reduce 
poverty, it is unlikely to be by much.
4. Explaining the Weak Jobs Recovery
Why did the great American jobs machine run out of steam in 
the 2001 recovery? 
One possibility is that the NBER incorrectly dated the end of 
the recession. While there is a range of uncertainty around the 
dating of a recovery, the current recovery looks reasonably 
normal outside of the labor market. Corporate profits have 
risen. The cumulative growth in profits during the eighth and 
eleventh quarters of the current recovery exceeds the average 
during the previous five recoveries. Real GDP has grown at a 
more rapid pace than it did during the 1990s, particularly since 
the eighth quarter of the recovery. But this cumulative growth 
is well below the average during the previous five recoveries. 
Industrial production has also grown, albeit at much slower 
rates than during past recoveries, yet growth is still a healthy 
5 percent-plus. The slower growth of industrial production 
partially reflects the continuing shift toward a service economy.
Is it possible that the weak jobs recovery reflects increased 
rigidity in the U.S. labor market, consistent with the orthodox 
explanation of weak employment growth in Europe in the 
1990s? Clearly not. Neither the current administration nor the 
Clinton administration enacted new regulations on 
unemployment insurance or welfare benefits that might 
adversely affect the level of employment.
Could the weak jobs recovery reflect conservative central 
bank policy of the type that the European Central Bank 
adopted during the 1990s? Again, clearly not. Although the 
Federal Reserve has been raising interest rates over the past few 
months (and in our view, will likely continue to do so), it has 
kept rates quite low during the recovery.
So why has the jobs machine stalled? 
4.1 Productivity Growth?
At the outset, we reject the seemingly attractive idea that 
increased productivity explains the weak jobs recovery. This is 
a circular argument. Increases in productivity due to 
technological and other innovations shift out the country’s 
aggregate supply curve, which increases the growth of potential 
GDP and permits greater employment growth without 
inflation than would otherwise be the case. The puzzle is why 
increased productivity, coupled with record growth in fiscal 
stimulus and record low interest rates, has not generated 
sufficient GDP growth to crank up the great American jobs 
machine as quickly as it did in other recoveries. 
Unlike productivity growth, some factors that may have 
contributed to the weak recovery are U.S. performance in the 
international economy and domestic and foreign investment in 
the United States, rising health care costs, the nature of the 
fiscal stimulus, and structural economic change. We now 
consider these factors.
4.2 U.S. Performance in the International
Economy
In the current recovery, the trade deficit has risen to levels 
unprecedented in recent U.S. experience. The ratio of exports 
minus imports relative to GDP increased from -4.2 percent to 
-5.4 percent between 2001:4 and 2004:3 (Table 3). As a share of 
GDP, this is the largest trade deficit in U.S. economic history 
and it represents a larger than normal increase in trade deficits 
in a recovery, but it is not the largest increase on record. In the 
1980s recovery, the trade deficit rose from -0.5 percent to 
-2.4 percent.
There has been much discussion about jobs being “off-
shored” in the weak recovery. Government statistics do not 
provide even crude measures of the number of jobs off-shored 
in the service industries. For example, although Indian 
exporters report several billion dollars of exports in computer-
related and telecoms services and many major U.S. companies 
proclaim off-shoring of service sector jobs as way to improve 
profits, government statistics record less than a billion dollars 
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Table 3
Components of GDP in the 2001 Recovery and Earlier Recoveries,
Seasonally Adjusted at Annual Rates
Percent
Start of Recovery
November 2001 March 1991 November 1982 March 1975 November 1970 February 1961
(X-M)/GDP
First quarter of recovery -4.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 -1.4 -0.2
Twelfth quarter of recovery -5.4 -0.8 -2.4 -1.4 -1.1 -0.4
Change -1.2 -0.6 -1.9 -1.4 0.3 -0.2
Exports/GDP
First quarter of recovery 9.9 8.0 5.5 5.4 4.4 3.7
Twelfth quarter of recovery 10.4 8.7 5.3 4.9 4.8 3.7
Change 0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.5 0.5 0.0
Imports/GDP
First quarter of recovery 14.1 8.3 6.0 5.4 5.8 3.9
Twelfth quarter of recovery 15.7 9.6 7.7 6.3 5.9 4.1
Change 1.7 1.3 1.7 0.9 0.1 0.2
Government consumption expenditures
  and gross investment/GDP
First quarter of recovery 18.3 22.0 22.5 24.1 26.9 29.6
Twelfth quarter of recovery 17.9 20.2 21.9 21.7 22.4 28.7
Change -0.4 -1.8 -0.6 -2.4 -4.5 -0.9
Federal/GDP
First quarter of recovery 6.2 9.5
Twelfth quarter of recovery 6.7 8.0
Change 0.5 -1.4
National defense/GDP
First quarter of recovery 4.0 6.9
Twelfth quarter of recovery 4.5 5.5
Change 0.5 -1.4
Nondefense/GDP
First quarter of recovery 2.2 2.5
Twelfth quarter of recovery 2.2 2.5
Change -0.1 0.0
State and local/GDP
First quarter of recovery 12.1 12.5
Twelfth quarter of recovery 11.2 12.1
Change -0.9 -0.4
Source: Authors’ calculations, from Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 1.1.6.12 The Weak Jobs Recovery
over time. Estimates from business groups of the magnitude of 
off-shoring suggest that upwards of 300,000 to 400,000 jobs are 
off-shored per year,10 which would make off-shoring a 
substantial contributor to the jobless recovery. By contrast, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys on job displacement record 
only a minuscule number of losses attributable to off-shoring, 
in part because the questions posed to displaced workers are 
not asked in such a way as to obtain the appropriate statistic. 
The U.S. Government Accounting Office, which recently 
examined the quality of official statistics, found the data to be 
virtually useless for measuring job losses.11
What is well measured and unprecedented is the huge drop 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States as a 
share of GDP during the current recovery. In 2001, FDI was 
1.6 percent of U.S. GDP; in 2003, it was 0.3 percent. In the two 
previous recoveries, foreign direct investment rose as a share of 
GDP, presumably directly creating jobs in the United States. 
But in this recovery, FDI fell, largely reflecting a decrease in 
Europe’s direct investment in the United States. 
However, simply ascribing some of the weak job growth to 
such international factors as trade, domestic and foreign direct 
investment, and off-shoring does not give a complete 
explanation. That the value of the dollar fell relative to the euro 
and the pound despite rapid increases in productivity demands 
some deeper explanation as to why the United States did not 
fare better in the international markets.
4.3 The Impact of Health Care Costs
Another factor behind the weak jobs recovery may be the 
U.S. mode of funding medical insurance. Health insurance 
spending per employee has risen sharply in the United States, 
albeit over a longer period than the current recovery. It adds a 
substantial marginal cost to employing workers, and many 
firms have sought ways to operate without committing to 
permanent workers who obtain such benefits.
The Kaiser Family Foundation finds that between 2000 and 
2003, employment of people with employer-sponsored health 
care coverage fell 2.8 percent, a considerably greater drop than 
the overall fall in employment in that period. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that some of the stagnant 
employment growth may be associated with rising health care 
costs, and ultimately with the country’s distinct mode of 
financing health insurance. Reber and Tyson (2004) also find 
support for rising health insurance costs as a deterrent to 
employment growth. Furthermore, Gould (2004) and others 
continue to document the decline in employer-provided health 
coverage. The high cost of medical care may contribute to the 
tendency of firms to employ more temporary workers than 
full-time workers in the recovery.
4.4 Less Bang for the Fiscal Stimulus Buck?
A third possible factor is the nature of the fiscal stimulus, which 
gave the vast bulk of the tax cuts to wealthy people whose 
propensity to spend quickly is likely to be less than that of 
people in middle- and lower income groups. Between 2001 and 
2004, the U.S. fiscal deficit rose 3.5 percentage points relative to 
potential GDP, from a surplus of 1.1 percent to a deficit of 
2.4 percent (Table 4). This rise exceeds the increase in the 
deficit and the size of the stimulus in the 1990s, 1980s, and 
1970s recoveries. Yet actual GDP grew just 8 percent between 
2001 and 2003, despite the huge stimulus. This is a lower 
growth rate than the rate in the two previous recoveries, when 
the fiscal stimulus was weaker. We suspect that the larger 
stimulus had a smaller effect on GDP growth because the tax 
cuts were slanted to the extremely wealthy. Table 4 also shows 
that if current policies continue, the stimulus will rival the 
growth that occurred from 1982 to 1986. In addition, the table 
reports that the Congressional Budget Office’s forecasted 
budget deficit as a share of potential GDP for 2005 is predicted 
to fall slightly, to 2.6 percent. 
Furthermore, several forms of government spending that 
might be expected to have a more direct effect on employment 
fell relative to GDP: federal government consumption 
expenditures and gross investment, and state and local 
spending. Table 3 shows that as a share of GDP, expenditures 
and investment have fallen 0.4 percent from the first quarter of 
the recovery to 2004:3. The cumulative change in the fiscal 
stimulus tells the same story. State and local expenditures also 
decreased as a share of GDP, from 12.1 to 11.2 percent. This 
0.9 percent drop exceeds the 0.4 percent decline during the 
1990s recovery. 
The increase in government spending that added to the 
fiscal deficit came by way of greater federal expenditures on 
national defense, which may have less of an impact on the labor 
market than do other forms of spending. As a share of GDP, 
expenditures on national defense increased from 4.0 to 
4.5 percent during the current recovery, compared with a 
decline from 6.9 to 5.5 percent during the 1990s recovery. The 
combination of spending to finance the war on terror, which 
probably has a smaller job multiplier than other forms of 
public investment, and the drop in state and local expenditures 
arguably weakened fiscal policy’s effect on job creation.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 13
Analysts have proposed two other reasons for the weak jobs 
recovery. Although the data supporting the reasons seem 
ambiguous, we briefly discuss them.
4.5 Structural Change?
Groshen and Potter (2003) argue that the permanent 
relocation of workers from declining industries to growing 
ones has contributed to the jobless recovery. Their measure of 
structural change is the proportion of workers in industries 
that experience similar changes in recessions and booms. They 
find that by this definition, the share of total employment in 
industries undergoing structural change was 51 percent during 
the mid-1970s and 1980s recoveries and 57 percent during the 
1990s recovery; it is 79 percent during the current recovery, 
arguably a reaction to the booming 1990s. Groshen, Potter, and 
Sela (2004) note further, though, that this division depends on 
the dating of the recovery. When employment turning points 
are used, the recession is deeper, longer, and more balanced 
between structural and cyclical flows. However, using a 
different measure—a cyclically adjusted variant of the Lillien 
measure of structural change (the variance of net employment 
growth by industry weighted by each industry’s average share 
of employment)—Aaronson, Rissman, and Sullivan (2004a, 
2004b) find no evidence that structural change has contributed 
to the jobless recovery.
4.6 Greater Uncertainty?
The growth of temporary employment in the 2001 recovery 
could reflect increased uncertainty about the post–9/11 
economic future. To evaluate this hypothesis, we compare the 
path of the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index 
in the current recovery with its path in the two previous 
recoveries (Chart 3). The chart shows that the level of 
consumer sentiment remains in the range of the two earlier 
recoveries. The current path does not look very different from 
that of the past, suggesting that greater uncertainty cannot 
explain employers’ growing use of temporary workers.
To explore the possibility that the consumer sentiment 
index is not accurately capturing the uncertainty, we compare 
the Michigan index with the Conference Board’s consumer 
confidence index, another widely watched measure. The 
consumer confidence index does show more variability, but 
Table 4
Fiscal Stimulus as a Percentage of Potential GDP 
Was Larger in the Weak Jobs Recovery 
Than in the Two Preceding Recoveries
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both indexes tell a similar story about views of the economy. 
We attribute the greater variation to each survey’s sampling 
framework. The consumer sentiment index retains a portion 
of its sample from month to month, while the consumer 
confidence index is based on a new random sample each 
month, making month-to-month comparisons problematic.12
We also plot the components of the consumer confidence 
index: the present situation index and the expectations index 
(Chart 4). Throughout the recovery, the two indexes have 
moved together, with both indicating cumulative gains. The 
expectations index, which is probably a better measure of 
economic and geopolitical uncertainty, has shown cumulative 
gains since the nineteenth month. If firms are unwilling to 
expand employment because of greater consumer uncertainty, 
these data do not confirm the expected patterns.
5. The Challenge to Analysts 
and Policymakers
The U.S. jobless recovery challenges analysts to determine 
whether the weak jobs recovery represents a major shift in the 
link between the labor market and the economy over the 
business cycle—a new business cycle reality—or whether it 
merely represents an idiosyncratic break in historic patterns, 
possibly due to the peculiarities of the 1990s boom. Our 
analysis favors the first theory, that something fundamental 
underlies the jobless recovery. However, only a more complete 
accounting of the factors causing the recovery can resolve this 
issue.
 The jobless recovery also poses a challenge to economic 
policy. As long as the United States makes full employment its 
main “welfare state” protection for workers, the country has to 
attain something akin to the late 1990s tightness in the labor 
market for economic growth to be shared among the entire 
population. Nothing short of that high rate of employment and 
low level of unemployment seems powerful enough to improve 
the employment and earnings opportunities for vulnerable 
groups. This challenge makes the jobless recovery particularly 
important to the nation’s economic well-being and brand of 
capitalism.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / August 2005 15
Appendix
Comparison of Growth in State Total Nonfarm Employment by Recovery
Percent









State 2002-04 1992-94 1983-85 2001-04 1991-94 1982-85 State 2002-04 1992-94 1983-85 2001-04 1991-94 1982-85
AL -0.3 5.0 7.4 -1.7 7.1 8.7 SC 1.3 5.2 9.0 0.3 6.2 11.5
AK 1.8 4.9 7.6 3.8 6.8 15.1 SD 0.7 7.6 6.0 0.3 12.0 8.4
CA 0.0 0.0 8.6 -1.0 -1.6 9.8 TX -0.1 6.6 7.6 -1.1 8.0 6.4
CO -1.7 9.9 6.9 -3.6 13.6 7.8 UT 0.9 11.8 10.1 0.2 15.4 11.3
CT -1.6 1.1 7.9 -2.6 -0.7 9.1 VT 0.2 5.1 8.9 -0.7 6.0 10.7
DE 0.3 4.3 10.2 -0.9 4.1 13.1 VA 2.0 5.4 11.2 1.3 6.2 14.4
DC 0.6 -2.2 5.4 2.2 -2.7 5.2 VI -3.6 -1.0 1.4 -6.3 1.4 1.1
GA 0.2 9.3 12.7 -1.7 11.2 16.7 WY 1.4 5.4 2.2 2.4 6.8 -4.9
HI 3.5 -1.2 4.8 3.8 -0.6 6.6 AZ 2.9 11.5 18.6 2.9 13.5 24.2
ID 1.8 10.7 5.7 1.9 15.8 7.6 AR 0.0 7.4 7.5 -0.7 10.4 10.7
IL -1.7 4.4 5.0 -3.5 4.4 3.5 FL 3.1 8.2 12.9 3.2 9.5 17.2
IN 0.1 6.2 6.9 -1.0 8.2 6.9 IA 0.2 5.4 3.2 -1.1 6.6 3.1
KS -1.5 4.6 5.0 -2.4 6.4 5.0 LA 0.6 5.8 1.7 -0.4 6.8 -1.0
KY -0.1 5.9 8.5 -1.0 8.3 7.7 ME -0.3 3.8 7.8 -0.6 3.5 10.3
MD 1.0 3.1 9.5 1.3 2.2 12.7 MI -2.4 5.6 10.5 -4.1 6.6 11.5
MA -2.9 3.9 8.7 -5.2 2.9 10.9 MO 0.2 5.9 8.1 -1.0 7.0 9.0
MN 0.2 5.7 8.6 -0.8 8.1 9.3 NV 6.5 15.6 10.8 6.6 17.4 11.3
MS -0.2 9.9 5.8 -0.8 12.6 6.1 NH 0.1 7.4 13.8 -1.3 8.5 18.2
MT 1.5 7.5 1.1 2.6 12.0 1.9 NM 2.4 9.3 8.5 3.6 12.3 9.9
NE -0.4 6.1 6.5 -1.2 7.7 6.7 HI -1.5 4.7 6.8 -3.2 5.3 6.0
NJ 0.7 2.7 7.9 0.3 1.5 10.4 OR 0.2 7.5 6.6 -1.1 9.5 7.2
NY -0.5 1.3 6.0 -2.0 -0.7 6.8 PA -0.8 2.3 4.6 -1.5 2.1 3.3
NC -0.4 7.5 9.6 -1.9 9.3 13.0 TN 0.6 7.9 8.7 -0.3 11.0 9.7
ND 0.9 6.4 0.5 0.9 8.9 0.9 WA 1.2 3.7 7.8 -0.4 5.8 9.0
OK -2.2 4.7 -0.5 -3.5 5.7 -4.2 WV -1.4 5.4 2.6 -1.8 7.2 -1.7
PR 1.9 4.7 7.3 1.0 7.2 7.9 WI 0.6 5.6 6.2 -0.5 8.2 6.2
RI 1.3 2.2 8.3 1.5 3.0 9.9Endnotes
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1. Authors’ tabulations, based on the Current Population Survey’s 
household survey (<http://www.bls.gov>). From November 2001 to 
December 2004, the number employed increased by 3.9 million 
individuals. The average increase after thirty-eight months during the 
previous five recoveries was 7.0 million. In percentage terms, 
employment in the household survey grew 2.9 percent and 8.0 percent 
during the previous recoveries.
2. For a discussion of differences in changes in employment between 
the establishment and household surveys, see <http://www.bls.gov
/cps/ces_cps_trends.pdf>.
3. The published monthly employment figures are from the 
establishment-level Current Employment Statistics (<http://
www.bls.gov>). The monthly time series used in the analysis spans 
February 1961 to December 2004, covering five boom, bust, and 
recovery episodes. We use the NBER Business Cycle Dating 
Committee’s designations to identify the episodes. The periods of 
expansion, recession, and recovery that are the length of the current 
recovery are as follows: March 1991-March 2001, March 2001-
November 2001, and November 2001-November 2004; November 
1982-July 1990, July 1990-March 1991, and March 1991-March 1994; 
March 1975-January 1980, January 1980-July 1980, and July 1980-July 
1984; November 1970-November 1973, November 1973-March 1975, 
and March 1975-March 1978; and February 1961-December 1969 and 
December 1969-November 1970 (the thirty-sixth month after 
November 1970 is in the middle of the November 1973-March 1975 
recession).
4. John Leland, “For Unemployed, Wait for New Work Grows 
Longer,” New York Times, January 9, 2005.
5. Authors’ tabulations, based on Current Employment Statistics. 
Figures for temporary-help services are only available starting with the 
1990s recovery.
6. Examining the hypothesis that an excessive boom in the new 
economy underlies the recession, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman 
Roger Ferguson concludes, “detecting asset-price overvaluations and 
undervaluations is controversial in hindsight and arguably impossible 
in real time” (Ferguson 2005). He further concludes that asset-price- 
bust recessions, such as the March 2001-November 2001 period, are 
not necessarily any longer, deeper, and associated with a larger drop in 
output and investment than previous recessions.
7. Rodgers and Freeman (2005) go into greater depth documenting 
the fragility of the gains that these groups made during the 1990s.
8. The micro data used in this analysis are from the annual Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Group Files of the Current Population Survey 
(1979-2003). We use the data files and extraction software produced 
by Unicon Research Corporation. These files allow us to describe the 
experiences of specific demographic groups, such as new entrants. 
However, this gain in heterogeneity comes with costs. The files start in 
1979. Furthermore, because of the annual nature of the data, we must 
approximate the recoveries, which are 1982-84, 1991-93, and 2001-03.
Our samples are made up of all men and women at least sixteen 
years of age, new entrants (zero to ten years of potential experience), 
and nonenrolled individuals ages sixteen to twenty-four. Potential 
experience is defined as: age – years of schooling – 5. In years where 
educational attainment is measured by degree, years of schooling is 
approximated by using Jaeger’s (2003) imputation approach. Our 
nonenrolled youth sample is based on individuals who respond “no” 
to being enrolled in school (school enrollment question). The 
employment-population ratio is the ratio of the number of employed 
to the sum of the number looking for work, the number working, the 
number with a job but not working, and all those who are out of the 
labor force. The ratio is constructed from the MLR (Monthly Labor 
Force Recode) variable in the Unicon Research Corporation CPS 
Utilities files. In these files, the variable has been made consistent 
across time to reflect changes in the question. The natural logarithm 
of real hourly earnings is constructed from the respondent’s pay 
status. If the respondent reported that he or she is paid on an hourly 
basis, we took the logarithm of their hourly wage. If the respondent 
reported that he or she is paid on a weekly basis, we took the logarithm 
of the ratio of their usual weekly earnings and usual hours worked per 
week. We deflated nominal hourly wages using the CPI-UX-1 deflator. 
It is important to note that these two labor market outcomes 
correspond to the respondent’s labor market activity during the last 
week and hourly wages at his or her current job.
9. Authors’ weighted tabulations, based on the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Data FERRET.
10. John C. McCarthy, “3.3 Million U.S. Services Jobs to Go 
Offshore,” Forester Research Brief, November 11, 2002 (<http://
www.forrester.com/ER/Research/Excerpt/0,1317,15900,00.html>) 
and “Offshoring: Where Have All the Jobs Gone?” Goldman Sachs 
Global Economic Research Report no. 03/38, September 2003.Endnotes (Continued)
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11.  “Current Government Data Provide Limited Insight into 
Offshoring of Services,” U.S. Government Accounting Office, 
September 2004 (<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04932.pdf>).
12. The consumer confidence index is developed from a monthly 
survey of 5,000 households (<http://biz.yahoo.com/c/terms/
conf.html>). The consumer sentiment index is constructed from the 
monthly Survey of Consumers. This survey is an ongoing, nationally 
representative survey based on approximately 500 telephone 
interviews with adult men and women living in households in the 
coterminous United States (forty-eight states plus the District of 
Columbia). Each month, an independent cross-section sample of 
households is drawn. The respondents chosen in this drawing are 
reinterviewed six months later, creating a rotating panel. The total 
monthly sample is typically 60 percent new respondents and 
40 percent reinterviewees (<http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/>). References
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